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preceding books of which we would gladly have given an account.

In the opening of this book, Celsius is arguing in favour of the worship of demons; a name which, though in Christian use always employed in a bad sense, was not so understood by the heathen. They used the word to indicate those inferior spirits whom, as they supposed, the Supreme God employed in the ministration of human affairs. Christians, however, always used the word in a bad sense: and they supposed that the gods whom the heathens worshipped, Jupiter, Juno, &c., were in reality demons—in testimony of which Origen appeals to the words of the Psalm, which he translates, “As for the gods of the heathen, they are but demons.” (Ps. 96. 5.)

Celsus, then, is in the commencement replying to the Christian answer to his arguments for the worship of demons, namely, that it was not lawful for them to serve two masters. He says this language is employed by persons who invest their god with human affections. A man is annoyed if his servant undertake to serve another also, because he suffers injury by being worse served himself. And so, indeed, it is not right to attempt to worship several demons, or several heroes, because one cannot equally well serve them all. But as God is capable of suffering no pain or injury, we need not, through fear of him, refrain from worshipping others. Nay rather, when we worship several gods, we do honour to Him who is above all, since we honour what belongs to him. Now, we cannot honour any to whom this has not been given by Him. The worship given to those who pertain to God does not displease or grieve God, to whom all belong.

The reader will see that Celsus was not an idolater, if by idolatry we are to understand, as Roman Catholic writers do, the giving that honour to a creature which we believe to be due to the supreme God. Celsus and his heathen friends did not imagine the creatures whom they worshipped to be the supreme God. They were careful to offer them only such honour as they believed to be not displeasing to the Supreme; nay rather, to be pleasing in his sight, since addressed to those who were ministers employed by Him, and to whom this honour had been conceded by Him.

Origen commences his reply to this by an examination of the sense in which the words God and Lord are used in Scripture. We read in the Bible of Gods and Lords in the plural number; for instance, "He is God above all Gods." Ps. 96, 9. "God standeth in the congregation of the Gods." Ps. 81, 1. "Give thanks unto the God of Gods." Ps. 135, 2. And St. Paul says, 1 Cor. 8, 5, "Although there be who are called Gods in heaven and on earth, as there are Gods many and Lords many, yet, to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and over Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things." By these Gods and Lords, Origen understands not the heathen Gods, whom he holds to be only dæmons, but the angels. "But then," he says, "although there be many who are in name and many who are in reality Gods, and many we must necessarily suppose among them, yet those who are adored as Gods by the heathen, but even those Gods that Scripture mentions, He raises himself above all dæmon worship who refuses to do anything acceptable to dæmons: and he raises himself above the portion of those called Gods by St. Paul, who cannot be persuaded to worship anyone else in conjunction with God, or to attempt to serve two masters."

with God, or to attempt to serve two masters." As for the objection that God is not a man, and, therefore, cannot be injured by our giving our service to another, Origen well replies, "He, God, is not injured, but we are injured, if we separate himself from the portion of Him who is over all. We do not worship God as if He needed our worship, or as if He suffered grief or injury when we withhold our worship, but that we ourselves might receive the benefit of our worship, and might be free from grief and suffering, in serving the Supreme God, through his only begotten Son."

Then, Celsus says, that he only contends that those may be worshipped to whom this has been granted by God. Origen replies: "How will you prove that this honour has been given them by God, and not rather by men who erred through ignorance, in falling away from Him to whom their worship was properly and exclusively due?"

Celsus next objects: "How can you blame us for worshipping others beside the Supreme God, since you yourselves worship a man who appeared but lately, and you think that you do God no injury in worshipping his minister?" Origen answers by denying that Christians worshipped a man, and quotes the texts, "I and my Father are one;" "Before Abraham was, I am;" in proof that our Lord's existence did not date from the time of his appearance in the world, and that the object of Christian worship was none other than the Supreme God.

Celsus went on to infer, "If you worship the Son of God, you must allow that not only God, but also his ministers, may be worshipped."

Origen answers, "If by the ministers of God you meant Gabriel, Michael, and the other angels and archangels, I should, perhaps, with some modifications as to the meaning of this word, 'worship' (*θεραπεύω*), and as to the acts of worship, state my views on this subject. But since those whom you call ministers of God, we believe to be demons, ministers of evil, and servants of the prince of this world, we refuse to venerate or worship them. And we venerate God alone, and his only Son, his word and image, with

our supplications according to our power, offering our prayers to the God of all, through his only begotten Son."

This is one of the passages which Mr. Power cites, and which Roman Catholics think favourable to them, because Origen says, that, perhaps, in a certain sense he might apply the word *ερωτεύω* to angels. But the whole context makes it plain that while Origen would regard angels as entitled to all the respect and honour which Protestants are willing to give to those ministers of God, he considered the offering of prayers as that part of worship which could lawfully be paid to God alone, through Christ.

The passage next following, in which Celsius finds fault with the Christians because they had no temples, no altars, no images, would lead to so long a discussion that we must postpone it, interesting as it is, to another opportunity, and are satisfied to stop here, as the last passage which we have quoted is the only one we can find which contains anything like a concession in favour of the Roman Catholic views.

CHARGE OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN.

THE recent charge of his Grace the Archbishop of Dublin to his clergy, at the late Triennial visitation, contains so much valuable matter, practical, as well as controversial, that we cannot do better than call the attention of our readers to the following extracts from it, without venturing to make any observations of our own upon the subject. We sincerely wish we could contribute in any way to the furtherance of the great object which his Grace seems to have had in view, in selecting the subject of it, viz., the more general and frequent attendance at the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper by all who profess to be worshippers of Jesus.

The following are the extracts referred to :—

" I cannot doubt that among the causes which have led to the neglect of the ordinance of the Lord's Supper by many, and in one Christian sect to the absolute rejection of it, must be reckoned the superstitions that have prevailed on the subject. For, every kind of superstition, besides the intrinsic evil of it, has a tendency to cast discredit on any doctrine or institution that has been abused by an admixture of human devices. The ' wall daubed with untempered mortar,' which has been built up by presumptuous man, has a tendency to bring down in its fall the original and sound parts of the building. And thus the superstitious adoration of the elements of bread and wine—not to mention that it has exposed to contemptuous rejection the religion itself of which it was represented as a part—led, by a natural re-action, to the entire exclusion of the sacrament itself, which had been thus abused, from the list of Christian ordinances. The manifest futility of the theory of transubstantiation, and the superstition thence resulting, caused a well-known sect to reject the ~~communion~~ ^{the} falsehood. And ~~ourselves~~ there have arisen of late years (and this is one of my reasons for now calling your attention to the subject) persons teaching strange mystical notions respecting this sacrament, such as it is hardly possible to distinguish from the doctrine of transubstantiation, and which have probably contributed to lead many of themselves and of their admirers to take the consistent step of openly going over to the Church of Rome. For when such a theory is maintained as has been, by some professed members of our Church, in manifest contradiction to the express word of our Article—an Article which they explain away in a 'non-natural sense' in such a way that anything may be made of anything—when it is maintained that 'the wicked and such as be void of a lively faith, when they do carnally and visibly press with their teeth the sacramental bread, are partakers of the body of Christ (though to their own condemnation), a strong presumption is created in favour of a Church which, consistently with this doctrine, teaches the adoration of the ~~Host~~.'

"Some Protestants we meet with who congratulate themselves on their exemption from Romish error on this and on other points, but who need to be reminded that they are guilty of a worse fault themselves than what they censure in their brethren! from many of whom they might take an example to their own profit. For we find but too many Protestants (as I observed just now) withdrawing from the Lord's table, in disregard of his plain injunction; while Roman Catholics do perform what they conceive to be a duty, though under what we hold to be erroneous notions concerning it. And yet there is much more reason for *them* to shrink from it under that kind of mysterious dread which so often keeps back Protestants. For what we have to trust to is, the divine commands and promises, together with that faith and devotion of our own of which we can judge from our own consciousness. But the Romanist has to rely, in addition, on the inward intention of the priest. If he be a secret infidel, not intending, nor believing it possible, to convert the bread into the Lord's body, and inwardly regarding the whole service with disdainful mockery (and this is what hundreds of priests declared of themselves at the time of the French Revolution), the whole sacrament is nullified; so that no Romanist can have a reasonable certainty that he is not adoring a morsel of common bread. Yet many of them perform, nevertheless, what they sincerely believe to be their duty, while many a Protestant omits what he acknowledges to be his.

"As for those semi-Romish theories (as they may be called) which I have adverted to, I shall not attempt any particular examination of them, as they are so mystically obscure that it may be well doubted whether even the framers of them attach themselves, any distinct meaning to their own language; and it cannot be doubted that to plain ordinary Christians they must be altogether unintelligible. But I would remark, in reference to the doctrine of transubstantiation itself, and to any others closely approaching it, that it is not advisable to resort (as some eminent divines had done) to metaphysical arguments relating to the properties of matter, or to appeals to the bodily senses, or to allegations of the abstract impossibility of such a miracle as is in this case pretended. At least, any considerations of this kind should hold a secondary and very subordinate place; and the primary and principal appeal should be made to the plain declarations of Scripture in their most natural sense. If we are fully convinced that the Scriptures contain a divine revelation, we are required to receive whatever they distinctly assure us of, however little we may be able to understand its possibility. But, then, if it be something extremely paradoxical, we may fairly expect to have—if it is to be an article of faith—a more distinct and unmistakable declaration of it in Scripture than if it had been something antecedently probable, and in harmony with the rest of what is revealed.

"Now, to the present case this principle will apply. It is, indeed, not correct to say (though it is very commonly said) that the alleged miracle of transubstantiation contradicts the senses. For, all that is testified by the senses is, the *attributes* (the accidents) of any material object—the appearance, for instance, and smell, and taste of bread; and all these attributes the advocates of transubstantiation admit to remain unchanged. Our belief that that which has these attributes is the substance of bread is an *inference* which we draw from the testimony of our senses; but however correct the inference may be, it is not the very thing which the senses themselves testify, but a conclusion deduced from the perception of those qualities which the senses do present to us. To state the matter in the briefest form; the procedure of Protestants, and—in all other cases—of Roman Catholics also, is this: Whatever has all the accidents of bread is the substance, bread: this that is before us has those accidents; therefore it is the substance, bread. Now, of the two premises from which this inference is drawn, it is the minor only that the senses attest, and it is the other premise that the Romanist denies. But he draws a like inference with ours, from the testimony of his senses, in all other cases though he maintains, in this one case, not that our senses deceive us, but that there is a change of the substance of bread into that of a human body, while all the accidents (as they are called), of which—and of which alone—the senses take cognizance, remain unchanged. And if asked how this can be, and how a body can be at once, and entire, in thousands of places at once, he replies by a reference to the Divine Omnipotence. But it is admitted that all this is extremely paradoxical, and that the alleged miracle is a complete contrast to the acknowledged miracles of Jesus and his Apostles, which were appealed to the senses—*Signs* (as they were usually called) of a Divine mission; *proofs* as a foundation for faith; not matter of faith to be received in consequence of our being already believers in the religion taught. The miracles that are recorded in Scripture cannot ever be reckoned improbable; for, great as is, no doubt, the abstract in probability of any miracle, considered simply in itself, it is plain that (as is well observed by Origen) the propagation of Christianity by the sole force of miraculous claims, supposing them unfounded—the overthrow of the religions of the whole civilised world by a handful of Jewish peasants and fishermen, destitute of all superhuman powers—would be far more improbable than all the miracles narrated in Scripture. Even if we had, therefore, less full and distinct statements in Scripture of the miracles of Jesus and his Apostles than we have, there would have been a strong presumption that these men could not have done what they did but by the display of miraculous signs.

"But as for the alleged miracle of transubstantiation, it is but reasonable that we should at least require a very strong and clear declaration of it in the Inspired Writings. And here it may be worth while to remark by the way, that it is not only paradoxical, but at variance even with the very description given of it by those who maintain it. For if you ask any one of them to state what was, e.g. the first miraculous sign displayed by Moses, he will say it was the change of the rod into a serpent; that which had the form, colour, motion, and, in short, all the 'accidents' of a serpent being in reality Moses' rod; and he will say, not that the serpent was changed into a rod, but, on the contrary, that the rod was changed into a serpent. In like manner, therefore, if that which has the appearance and all the 'accidents' of bread be, in reality, a human body, he should say, not that bread is converted into the body, but that the body has become bread. And if he says that that which was originally bread is changed into the Lord's body, he must yet say also that that body is immediately after-converted into bread.

"All this surely requires, as I have said, very clear and strong Scripture authority to establish it. But when we ask for this, we are referred to such a passage as 'This

is my body; which is parallel to many others that every one understands figuratively: as when our Lord is called a Lamb, a Vine, a Shepherd, and a Door, and our Passover; and when He says expressly, in explaining his parables, 'The Seed is the word of God,' 'The Reapers are the Angels,' and the like. Thoroughly familiar as the disciples must have been with such figurative expressions, it seems impossible to doubt that they must have so understood Him when He presented to them bread, saying 'This is my body.' If, indeed, He had not in person instituted the ordinance, but his Apostles, after his departure, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit introduced it, using the words 'This is the Lord's body,' there might have been some little danger—though but very little, even so—that some disciples might have supposed some miraculous though invisible change of substance to be meant. But, as if on purpose to guard against this, He Himself began the celebration of the rite; knowing, as He must have known, that the Apostles could not have thought that He was holding his own body in his own hands, and giving it to them, but would feel sure that He was speaking of a representation—a symbol of his body; and to most of them—probably to all—would occur what they had heard Himself say, not long before, that 'the flesh profiteth nothing; it is the spirit that giveth life,' implying, what is of itself perfectly reasonable, that the real literal flesh of the human body of the Son of Man, even if it could literally be received by our bodily organs, could not of itself, and merely as flesh, have any spiritual efficacy as regards the soul. No reasonable person can really doubt that the Apostles understood their Master to have been speaking at the Last Supper of the bread and wine as symbols of his body broken and his blood shed for them. And we may be sure that if this their belief had been at all erroneous, they would have received afterwards on so important a point a correction of their mistake, and whatever instruction was needed. Now, we know from their own writings that they not only received no such correction, but continued in their original belief; since we find Paul, e.g. speaking to the Corinthians of the 'bread that we break,' besides frequent incidental allusions in the Acts to the 'breaking of bread' as a well-known and established Christian ordinance. There can be no doubt, surely, in any rational mind that the Apostles did understand literally and not figuratively our Lord's injunction, 'Do this in remembrance of Me,' as what was to be obeyed (as they did obey it) by a real literal partaking of the bread and wine; and that they did understand figuratively and not literally his words, 'This is My body.' Now, the only safe test to apply in any case of possible doubt as to the right sense of anything said by our Lord or his Apostles, is to look to the sense (when we can ascertain it) in which their hearers understood them. And we may be sure that if any essential mistake were made by those persons as to the meaning of what was said, on some point of vital importance, that mistake would be rectified, and the right explanation given, either immediately or afterwards. In this case no correction was made of the sense in which the disciples must certainly have understood our Lord's words. And I need hardly remind you how earnestly in the Epistle to the Hebrews the oneness of Christ's sacrifice is contrasted with the continually repeated sacrifices of the Levitical Law; plainly showing that the Eucharist was understood to be not a fresh sacrifice, but a feast on the one sufficient sacrifice made 'once for all,' and that the breaking of his body and the shedding of his blood is commemorated, but not repeated. 'This Man, after he had offered one sacrifice for ever (*εἰς τὸ διηνεκές*), then sat down on the right hand of God. . . . for by one sacrifice he hath perfected for ever (*εἰς τὸ διηνεκές*) them that are partakers of sanctification, not (*ηγαπεύοντος*), them that are sanctified, in the *past* tense, but (*ἀγαπώντος*) in the present.^a And as for our Lord's expression 'My flesh is meat indeed' (*ἀληθῶς*)^b (which is followed in our Church Catechism which says that his body and blood 'are verily and indeed received by the faithful'), the Apostles must have understood Him as when He said 'I am the true vine' (*ἀληθινός*), which denoted not his being a vine in the *literal* sense, but in the highest and most *important* sense; even as Paul says that 'that is not circumcision—which is outward in the flesh' (which, literally, it clearly is), but that 'circumcision is of the heart; i.e., in the noblest and best sense. Among the errors, therefore—and doubtless there were many and great ones—which have arisen from an erroneous interpretation of Scripture, this is, I think, not to be reckoned. It must have arisen from human teaching, by pastors, and to a people, little acquainted with Scripture and paying little regard to it; and, accordingly, the doctrine does not appear to have existed for the first thousand years. But when introduced, and prevailing, Scripture was afterwards wrested into a sense that might seem to support it. And this will always be readily acquiesced in, if done by a Church which is believed to be the divinely-appointed infallible guide in all religious matters. The adherents of a supposed infallible Church, represent an implicit deference to the decisions of such a Church as the only safeguard against all conceivable wantonness of

interpretation; against an indefinite amount of error, from understanding figuratively what is meant to be taken literally, and literally what is not literally meant, according to each man's private judgment, as his own fancy may dictate. And certainly if we could have proof of the existence of any such infallible authority on earth; and also a clear indication where it is lodged, to this guide we should be bound to resort as a safeguard against erroneous interpretations. But in the absence of any such proof, an implicit deference to the interpretations of some earthly guide would be only substituting one man's caprice for another's. We have, however, in most cases, a very safe guide, by looking to the sense in which the hearers of our Lord and his Apostles understood them. For, as I already remarked, we may fully presume that this must have been—in any matter of vital importance—the true sense of what was said, unless an mistake was pointed out and corrected. Thus, as I observed just now, if the Apostles had been mistaken in supposing—as they undoubtedly did—that Jesus was holding in his hands and distributing to them, not his own literal body, but a symbolic representation of it, their mistake would have been corrected. Again, our Lord's expression 'Son of God,' as applied to Himself, is one which indeed might conceivably have borne the meaning of his being merely a highly favoured prophet. But we know that his judges did understand Him as claiming a divine character; and if this had been a mistake of theirs, we may be sure He would have corrected it; else He would have been bearing false witness against Himself. So also, if all the early Christians had been mistaken in their interpretation of anything that was said concerning our Lord's death, this their error would surely have been removed, and a different explanation given. Now, what they did understand, there can be no rational doubt. The idea of redemption by a sacrifice, however inexplicable, was one with which they were perfectly familiar; and they could never have thought, unless perfectly assured of it, that the real literal sacrifices of the Levitical law were types, not of a real sacrifice, but of a figure of speech—that 'the shadow of good things to come' which that law presented was much more substantial than that which it represented. Nor could they (to revert to a former remark)—familiar as they were with an idea of a feast upon a sacrifice—have thought that a mere martyrdom was to be celebrated by eating and drinking the symbols of the martyr's body and blood. The very same test, therefore—the appeal to what must have been understood at the time—serves to guard us against the opposite errors of understanding figurative expressions literally, and of explaining away as a figure what was meant to be literally understood. As for the latter of these errors, I have no doubt that the attempts of some persons to interpret as mere metaphors all the declarations of Scripture concerning Christ's offering of Himself have been greatly encouraged, and probably in many instances caused, by unwise and presumptuous endeavours to explain what Scripture has left unexplained, and to confirm what is there revealed to us by reconciling it with theories of man's devising. For, when objections which at least appear to some to be unanswerable are brought against any such theory, it is too late to resort to the plea that Divine mysteries are beyond the reach of our understanding, and that we must not venture to try them by the standard of human reason. Every one who brings forward a theory of his own, does, in fact, appeal to the tribunal of human reason, and binds himself to make his explanation intelligible and satisfactory. And when he fails to do this, the result will too often be that the doctrine itself which he seeks to elucidate and support by his explanations will be supposed by many to be dependent on these, and will be rejected along with the untenable theory. It is our wiser and safer course, therefore, as well as the more modest and humble, to confine ourselves, in these matters, to the express declarations of the inspired writers, and to warn men against listening to any one who ventures to go beyond these; who presents us with 'developments' (as they are sometimes called) that are to fill up the omissions of Scriptures, and who is thus in reality setting himself up as knowing more of the Divine mysteries than was revealed to the Apostles, or at least more than they were commissioned to reveal to us.

"It is our part, then, to warn our people against mistaking for a pre-eminent faith what is rather a deficiency of faith, and for humility what is in reality presumptuous rashness; and against being misled either by those who frame theories to explain what Scripture has left unexplained, or by those who, finding such theories untenable, reject what Scripture does assure us of. And the same really humble, unhesitating, submissive, and practical faith which we are required to have in the atoning sacrifice of the Son of God—the same is called for in reference to that feast on his sacrifice which we celebrate in the Eucharist; the ordinance which, as I just now observed, is not only a commemoration of his death, but also a strong confirmation of its sacrificial character. The numerous and distinct declarations, indeed, to that effect of the sacred writers would, alone, afford sufficient grounds for the conviction of the understanding; but it has seemed good to Divine Wisdom that we should not be left to search out passages of Scripture, and on these alone lay down the doctrine as a well estab-

lished article of our creed, but that we should moreover be continually reminded of it by the oft-repeated celebration of a rite which clearly implies the doctrine, and forcibly impresses it upon the mind. And as with respect to the doctrine itself, so also as to the ordinance which is a seal and a monument of it, men have fallen into corresponding faults. While some have presumed—as I observed at the beginning—to frame theories not warranted by Scripture, others have been led—partly from that very cause—to reject, or very much to neglect, the ordinance itself. Fanciful speculations respecting the nature of substance and accidents tend naturally to cast a discredit in the minds of the rash and unthinking on a divine institution which has been thus deformed by an admixture of human devices; just as rash attempts at explanation of revealed mysteries, that are quite beyond human reason, have led to the rejection, along with the human theories, of the doctrines themselves which are revealed. Anything quite alien from all notions of natural reason, it is allowable to regard so far with distrust as to require that it should be fully established by sufficient proof; and if not so established, we do well to reject it. But if it does appear to be plainly declared in Scripture, it then becomes a reasonable and suitable trial of our faith. Reason itself would pronounce that there must be much in the counsels of the Most High that is beyond the reach of reason; and that positive commands respecting things originally indifferent must justly claim obedience when coming from lawful authority. For if we are to believe merely that we can fully understand and explain, and to do merely what appears to natural conscience to be a duty, independently of any command, this would be to make the word of our Divine Master go for nothing. But it is remarkable that we may sometimes find even the very same persons objecting to what Scripture reveals or enjoins, unless they can see reasons for it independent of Scripture, and yet expecting to find in Scripture what is not contained in it—exact precepts for every point of moral conduct. One may sometimes find persons pleading, when they wish to evade some moral (i.e., natural) duty, that there is no injunction as to this or that in the Bible—that so and so is nowhere forbidden; as if we had no moral faculty, and were to expect in Scripture a distinct and complete enumeration of things to be done and avoided, instead of the general precept, 'Whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, and of honest and of good report, to think on these things.' And then, again, some, and perhaps the very same persons, when positive precepts are in question, will ask what efficacy there can be in a sprinkling with water, or in partaking of bread and wine. Why, if these did profess any such natural efficacy as we know our ordinary food has for sustaining the natural life, there would be no trial of our obedient faith in doing what the Lord commands, simply on the ground of that command. If the water of the Pool of Siloam had been some medicinal spring that had the natural virtue to cure blindness, the blind man would have given no proof of faith in using it. But if, because there was no such virtue, he had refused to do what he was told—or if, like Naaman the Syrian, he had claimed a preference for some other waters—he should have remained blind. But with respect to this point—I mean the distinction between what are called moral (i.e., natural) duties and positive duties—things commanded because they are right, and things right because commanded—there exists in many minds a strange confusion of thought. Any one who makes inquiries on the subject for the first time of those around them, will be surprised to find the extent to which this confusion prevails, even among persons not uneducated, nor, generally, deficient in intelligence. And if you take occasion from time to time to put before your people such explanations as may guard them against these indistinct and confused notions on the subject, your labour will not have been superfluous or ill-applied. Far the greater number, however, are kept back from the Lord's Table by a kind of misdirected reverential feeling of dread lest they should be 'unworthy' partakers; as supposing that the ordinance is designed for those only who have attained to a certain perfection in holiness beyond what is required of Christians generally. It is for us to take occasion to explain to them, not only from the pulpit, but also (as will often be more effectual) in private conversation, that the unworthiness which the Apostle, and which our Reformers refer to, is a careless and irreverent partaking; a fault which in former times appears to have been prevalent; while in our own, a far different and rather opposite kind of error is the one most to be guarded against. We have the advantage of being able, in confirmation of anything we ourselves may urge as to this point, to direct the attention of our hearers to the written words of the Communion Service itself, which disclaim all trust in our own righteousness—all meritorious 'worthiness' to gather up the crumbs of the Lord's table.' And we should remind them also of the words of the Catechism respecting what is required of those who partake of the sacrament. It can be easily explained to any one who is sincerely well disposed, that it is not of the communicant alone, but of every Christian who would hope for God's favour, that it is required to 'examine himself whether he repeat him truly of his former sins, steadfastly purposing to lead a new life, and to have a lively faith in God's mercy through Christ, with a thankful remembrance of his death, and to be in charity with all

^a Heb. x. 12—14.
^b John vi. 55.
^c John xv. 1.

men.' Preparation for the Lord's table, therefore, he can easily be brought to perceive, is the same as preparation for the whole Christian life, and for a Christian death, and for a joyful resurrection. The communicant consequently does not take on himself any new obligation that did not lie on him before. He will, indeed, be the more likely to lead a Christian life, from his availing himself of the appointed means of grace; but the obligation to lead such a life is absolute and complete already. And it would be a manifest absurdity to imagine that a happy immortality could be attained on some different and easier terms by those who withdraw from the Lord's table; that a refusal to comply with that one commandment of our Saviour would exempt men from obedience to the rest of them. Any one, therefore, who deems himself not good enough to receive this sacrament, and accordingly absents himself, waiting till he shall become better prepared, is acting as the prodigal son in the parable would have done, if, instead of arising at once to go to his father, he had waited till he should be in a more prosperous condition, when it was his father only that could supply food and raiment to the destitute returning outcast. All this being what hardly any one would deliberately deny, it is found accordingly that most of the non-communicants have a design to communicate at some future time, before their death. And they seem to suppose that he who shall have done this will have sufficiently complied with our Lord's injunction. You will find many a one accordingly who will need to be earnestly and repeatedly reminded that every time he refuses the invitation to partake of the Lord's Supper he is committing a fresh sin—a distinct act of disobedience to his Divine Master. And, therefore, instead of preparing himself to be more 'meet partaker' of the heavenly feast, he is habitually alienating himself more and more from his Saviour, by thus resisting, time after time, His repeated calls.

Others again, and not a few, we meet with, who do present themselves at the Lord's table, on some solemn occasions of rare occurrence, and who consider this as absolutely preferable to an habitual and frequent attendance, from finding that their devotional feelings are more strongly excited by a celebration that takes place at long intervals. But we should remind them that (though this is undoubtedly true) if they were to act on such a consideration throughout, they would discontinue daily prayer, and habitual attendance on all public worship; since these would certainly more strongly affect the feelings if they were of very rare occurrence. But the object to be aimed at is, we should point out to them—not an occasional, fervid, and probably transitory emotion—but an habitual, effectual, and lasting influence on the whole character and daily life—not a passing gleam of enthusiasm, but a steady daylight that shall enlighten our path and guide our steps. Such errors as I have adverted to, you will often, as I have said, be the best able to combat in private conversations, adapted to the peculiar habits of thought and tone of feeling of each individual. And of all the occasions for doing this, none can be more suitable than that of preparing young persons for the rite of confirmation. For, the earlier any erroneous notions are counteracted, the less is the danger of their leading to an inveterate practical habit. It is of great importance, therefore, that those confirmed should have the earliest possible opportunity of attending at the Lord's table, and should be earnestly pressed to avail themselves of it at once. And you will then be able to correct the mistake, which is sometimes to be met with even in religious parents, of imagining that a young person may be unfit, in point of religious knowledge, or of feeling, for receiving the Eucharist, and yet fit to be presented for confirmation. It may easily be explained to them that as this is manifestly a groundless notion, at variance with all reason, so it is no less at variance with the decisions of our Church. That all the members of the Church should be communicants is not only in many places implied, but is expressly laid down in a rubric. And the only limitation given of this word 'all' is, where it is enacted that those only shall come to the holy table who have 'been confirmed, or are ready and desirous to be confirmed,' which plainly implies that at least all who have been confirmed are bound to attend that table. This we should take care to impress on the minds of our people. And universally we should use all the means in our power for removing every obstacle of whatever kind to that full and frequent attendance at the Lord's Table which our Reformers, in conformity with Apostolic usage, manifestly designed. I do cherish a hope therefore—a hope in some degree fortified by experience—that by sedulously availing ourselves of such an occasion as I have been advertising to, we may at least somewhat diminish that great and abominable evil, the open practical neglect by a large proportion of our congregations of an acknowledged duty—an evil which you must have often contemplated both with grief for the individuals, and with shame, on account of the scandal it brings on our Church. At any rate, let no exertions be wanting on our part to set before our people what their duty is, 'whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear'; so that we, at least, may not be chargeable with neglect of our own duty, and may be 'pure from the blood of all men.'

WHO ARE HERETICS?

PROBABLY most of our readers would answer this question without much consideration, by saying that heretics are those who hold *heretical opinions*—that is, opinions at variance with the holy, orthodox faith which they themselves hold to be the only true one; Roman Catholics who hold their own faith to be the orthodox one, and all others heretical, would, of course, answer, that *all Protestants are heretics*.

The matter, at first sight, appears so plain as scarcely to require authority to prove it, and if any were wanting it might be found in the celebrated canons of the Fourth Council of Lateran, the third of which begins thus: "We excommunicate and anathematize every heresy which exalteth itself against the holy, orthodox, and Catholic faith; condemning all heretics, by whatsoever names they may be reckoned; who have, indeed, divers faces, but their tails are bound together, for they make agreement in the same folly."

Heresy is defined by theological Roman Catholic writers to be "a voluntary and pertinacious error against any truth of faith proposed by the Church, in a person who professes himself a Christian."

Such is, undoubtedly, the genuine doctrine of the Church of Rome; but as the duties of Roman Catholics towards heretics, as enjoined by the Pope's canon law, are rather difficult, and even dangerous, to be practised in Protestant (or, to use their language,) *heretical* countries, an ingenious distinction has in modern times been resorted to, which would relieve obedient sons of the Church from attempting the extermination of all heretics, at least until they become strong enough to do so with success and impunity.

The *matter* and *form* of the thing are to be considered, and heretics are, therefore, to be divided into *material* and *formal*—the latter alone being criminal, or censurable by the authority of the Church.

To be a *formal heretic*, a person must, it appears, "be conscious that he is guilty of heresy and pertinaciously persist in the crime."

The evidence of the Rev. Henry Neville and the Rev. Patrick Murray, D.D., two of the Professors of Theology at Maynooth, taken before the late Maynooth Commissioners of Inquiry, appears to be well worthy of consideration, and deserves to be more generally known than it is likely to be made in the ponderous blue books of the parliamentary papers.

We here propose to give our readers some extracts from this evidence, and, if our space permits, to add a few remarks upon them.

The REV. HENRY NEVILLE, who was first examined, October 6, 1853, and was not then asked as to this subject, was again brought forward on 10th July, 1854, to explain and get over the assertions of other witnesses on the subject of the persecution of heretics, thus answers:—

1. "You are one of the Professors of Theology who were previously examined by the Commissioners?"

"Yes."

2. "Will you be good enough to refer to a passage in Bailly, second volume, page 19, with reference to excommunication, which has been referred to by a previous witness, and state what is meant by 'heretics' in that passage in Bailly?"

"Quemam sint ponere contra hereticos latere?" What are the punishments decreed against heretics? 'The first spiritual punishment annexed to heresy by the canon law is *major excommunication, ipso facto, decreed against it*.' By 'heretics,' in this passage of Bailly, are meant persons guilty of the 'formal crime of heresy,' not persons who, through error, may hold doctrines in themselves heretical. In order to incur the 'formal crime of heresy,' doctrine must be proposed as of *faith by the Church, and pertinaciously rejected—the authority of the Church itself being already known, or, if not actually known, presented with such motives of credibility as it is imprudent to reject.*

3. "Do Protestants generally, or those not in communion with the Church of Rome, fall under that denomination?"

"Protestants fall under the denomination of 'material heretics,' because they are taken to hold doctrines declared heretical by the Church; but it is very improbable that Protestants in these countries, in any considerable number, are comprehended under heretics as above described; for Protestants, in general, have either not considered the matter so seriously, or have not had the motives of credibility of the Catholic doctrines submitted so satisfactorily to their minds as to incur the formal crime of heresy."

4. "Is the Queen, or are the Protestant people of these countries generally, included amongst those deemed heretics, against whom those punishments are denounced?"

"I do not think that the Queen and the Protestant members of the community in this country generally are included under the term 'heretics,' as contemplated in that passage."

5. "Does the Queen fall under the denunciation contained in that passage, by reason of being the head of a Church not in communion with the Church of Rome?"

"The fact that the Queen is the head of a Church not in communion with the Church of Rome is not a reason why she should be included under the heretics spoken of in the Bull. And it is, perhaps, well to remark, that what I have stated as required for formal heresy I do not state as mere opinion, but as the *doctrinal teaching of all our theologians*; and for this purpose I refer to Bailly, tome 2, page 17 (edition, Dublin, 1829). To the question, 'What is heresy?' he replies, 'It is a voluntary and pertinacious error against any truth of faith proposed by the Church, in a person who professes himself a Christian.'

^a Corpus Juris Canonici—Decretal Greg IX., Lib. v., Tit. vii., cap. 12. De hereticis.

^b Bailly. Tome 2, p. 17. Dublin: 1829.

7. "Is the denunciation in that Bull against formal heretics only, as contradistinguished from material heretics?"

"Distinctly against formal heretics alone; there is no censure for a merely material crime—that is, for an act sinful in its own nature, but not known to be such by the agent."

8. "That is to say, it applies only to those who are guilty of the offence of heresy, and not to those who merely entertain heretical opinions?"

"Yes."

12. "Is this distinction found anywhere in the 'Corpus Juris Canonici'?"

"The distinction is not found as explained, because it does not belong to the 'Corpus Juris Canonici' to explain terms, but to the commentators on the 'Corpus Juris Canonici' to explain the terms found in it."

13. "The 'Corpus Juris Canonici' uses simply the term 'heretics'?"

"Yes."

14. "And the commentators have given an interpretation to this word?"

"Yes."

15. "Did you say that the opinions of the commentators are universal or general?"

"They are universal; and it cannot be otherwise, because no sentence can be inflicted upon a party not sinning; and a material heretic, as far as the matter of faith is regarded, is guilty of no sin, as is evident from Bailly, page 18, where, heresy being distinguished into formal and material, he proceeds—'Formal heresy is that which we have defined above, namely, "it is the voluntary and pertinacious error against any truth of faith proposed by the Church, in a person who professes himself a Christian,"' but material heresy is an error by which a person believes something contrary to faith, not knowing that it is contrary to faith."

16. "Do these passages from Bailly, to which you now refer, form a portion of the lectures in the course of theology at Maynooth?"

"Yes, portions which are never omitted."

17. "Is that question, and are those distinctions, fully discussed and made known to the students?"

"Unquestionably."

18. "So that you think no intelligent student can leave Maynooth without being aware of the distinction?"

"I think no student can be unaware of that distinction."

19. "Is the application of that distinction between formal and material heretics also made known to the students, as bearing upon the condition of the Protestants within this realm?"

"That question not occurring in the house treatises, it is optional with the professors to discuss it or not. I have frequently heard it spoken of amongst the professors and students; and I never heard any person hesitate for a moment to assert that the generality of the Protestants in this country were mere material heretics. For it is not sufficient for heresy that you knowingly and deliberately hold a doctrine, or knowingly and deliberately hold it against the Catholic Church, but you must, besides, have the authority of the Catholic Church so proposed to you, that you will be imprudent and irrational in rejecting that authority; this constitutes pertinacity."

22. "Will you be good enough to define excommunication, and state the matters to which it applies?"

"Excommunication is an ecclesiastical censure, depriving persons subjected to it of what are called the common goods of the Church. What these goods are shall be explained in explaining the effects of excommunication. Excommunication is of two kinds, major and minor."

25. "Do the Protestant people of these countries lie under either of these excommunications?"

"The minor excommunication cannot at all affect the Protestants of this country. And the major excommunication cannot be said to be incurred by the Protestants of this country, seeing that they may fairly be supposed to be either not sinning or not contumacious—not sinning against any authority threatening the excommunication contained in this bull; or, at least, not contumacious against that authority, both of which are absolutely required in order that the censure be incurred."

26. "Are they at all under sentence of excommunication; are they denounced?"

"Unquestionably, they are not denounced; no person holds that any Protestant in these countries is under a denounced sentence of excommunication, because that could not be done without some public proclamation."

27. "Does the Queen lie under any such excommunication?"

"The Queen certainly is not under any denounced sentence of excommunication; nor do I suppose that the Queen can be under sentence of excommunication not denounced; for, in order to incur that, she should be aware of the sentence proclaimed against heresy, in the bull of which we are speaking; be conscious that she is guilty of the heresy, for which the excommunication is threatened, and still contumaciously persevere in it. Unless these three conditions concur in the person of the Queen, she cannot be under a non-denounced sentence of excommunication. It is highly probable, indeed certain, that the last two at least do not obtain in her Majesty."

31. "Does the Queen, in her capacity as head of the Established Church of England, fall under either class of excommunication?"

"The Queen of England, in her capacity as head of the Established Church of England, does not fall under either class of excommunication, because, as I said above, to incur excommunication the two conditions should be present—the sinning against an authority, recognized as such, and the contumaciously sinning against that authority—that is, the sinning after admonition."

32. "Is there any difference of opinion upon these points between what may be called the two classes of theologians in the Roman Catholic Church—the Ultramontane and the Cismontane?"

"There is no difference of opinion on these points. This is the universal teaching of all theologians on censures."

The REV. DR. MURRAY, in p. 364, Paper K., thus writes:—

"I. Excommunication cannot be inflicted except for a grievous sin. The sin, moreover, must be not only committed by a de-